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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW-Criminal Responsibility-Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit has adopted the ALI test for insanity.
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
Defendant Freeman was indicted and convicted on two counts of selling
narcotics' in a federal district court in New York. Defendant's principal
allegation at trial was that at the time of the sale of narcotics he did
not have sufficient capacity and will to be held responsible for the crim-
inality of his acts. The trial court, applying the M'Naghten Rule, re-
jected this contention. On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed and held that Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code
(hereinafter referred to as the ALI test) would now be the standard for
determining criminal responsibility in that jurisdiction. This test pro-
vides:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect"
do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct3
The alternative term "wrongfulness" rather than "criminality" was spe-
cifically adopted by the court.4
The adoption of the ALI test is an attempt to resolve the issue of
criminal responsibility, an area where there is a split of authority. To
date, the M'Naghten Rule5 is the test most jurisdictions have adopted.6
In these jurisdictions M'Naghten is used either as the sole criterion or
supplemented by the irresistible impulse test.7 In the federal system,
1. 21 U.S.C. §§ 173, 174 (1964).
2. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
4. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966).
5. . . . to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must clearly be proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
6. See Moore, Jr., M'Naghten is Dead-Or is It?, 3 HOUSTON L. REV. 58, 74-76 (1965).
7. A frequently referred to statement of the irresistible impulse test is found in Parsons
v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 597, 2 So. 854, 866-67 (1887):
If he did have such knowledge [i.e. under the M'Naghten Rule], he may never-
theless not be legally responsible if the two following conditions occur:
(1) If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost the power
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certain courts take the view that the Supreme Court has adopted the
M'Naghten Rule by its decisions in Davis v. United States9 and, the
M'Naghten Rule is followed.
However, other federal jurisdictions have not felt so restrained and
have established other tests for criminal responsibility. The first major
departure from the M'Naghten Rule is found in Durham v. United
States.0 The test established in Durham was that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or defect .... I' The M'Naghten Rule is criticized because its
right-wrong orientation limits expert psychiatric testimony. 2 The Dur-
ham test was considered to be particularly successful in solving this
problem.' 3
The next test established was the Currens test, which provides that
"[T] he jury must be satisfied that at the time. of committing the pro-
hibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.... " 4 The Currens test is a variation of the ALI test which rejects
the phrase "to appreciate the criminality of his conduct." The reason
given for this change is that reference to the cognitive element of the
personality would be only rarely significant. 15
Then in Wion v. United States,' the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit stated that it was "content" to adhere to the test for responsibility
found in its holding in Coffman v. United States' 7 "in the more simpli-
fied and understandable language of the ALI formula."" It would seem
that the ALI test had been expressly adopted. However, included in the
Wion opinion was a proposed charge to the jury.' 9 This charge stated that
before a verdict of guilty may be returned the jury must be satisfied that
to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as
that his free agency was at the time destroyed;
(2) and if, at the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental
disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely.
8. See Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 642 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
940 (1957) and Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1956).
9. 160 U.S. 469 (1895) and 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
10. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
11. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
12. See De Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 339, 341 (1955);
Remarks, Judicial Conference (2d Cir.), Insanity as a Defense, 37 F.R.D. 365, 387 (1964).
13. Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psychiatrist's Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A.J. 527,
529 (1962).
14. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961).
15. Id. at 774 n.32.
16. 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963).
17. 290 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1961).
18. Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 427 (10th Cir. 1963).
19. Id. at 430.
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the defendant was mentally capable of knowing what he was doing. The
use of the term know rather than the term appreciate which is used in
the ALI test would clearly reduce the latitude of the test.2 0
In light of these previous decisions, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit sought a workable solution. The M'Naghten Rule was
rejected because it is too narrow in scope. 2 That rule concentrates solely
upon the cognitive aspect of the personality and ignores those who com-
mit undesirable acts because of impairment of volitional capacity. Such
a test is unrealistic in the light of the advance in psychiatry's knowledge
of the human personality.22 Moreover, because the rule limits expert
psychiatric testimony to an opinion upon whether the defendant knew
right from wrong, the jury will be deprived of facts necessary to its
judgment.2 3
The irresistible impulse test which is used to supplement the
M'Naghten Rule was rejected because the name itself carries the impli-
cation that a crime impulsively committed is the result of a sudden,
purely spontaneous act.24 Durham was found to be unsatisfactory because
it is too vague and does not give the jury a standard by which to measure
the competency of the accused.2 5 Currens likewise was rejected because
it concentrates only upon the volitional aspect of the personality 26 and
is, therefore, only a partial test.27
The court then looked at the ALI test and concluded that it is free
of many of the defects of Durham2s and an infinite improvement over
M'Naghten. 9 The ALI test recognizes that the mind is a unified entity
and that its functioning may be impaired in many ways by a mental
disease or defect." Moreover, it is sufficiently precise to provide the
jury with an adequate standard with which to measure the competency
of the accused, but at the same time, is not unduly restrictive upon ex-
20. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 624 (2d Cir. 1966).
21. Id. at 618.
22. Id. at 619. See Model Penal Code, § 4.01 comment at 156-57 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1956); Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 45 MARQ. L. REV.
494, 498 (1962).
23. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (2d Cir. 1966).
24. Id. at 621.
25. In illustration of this point the Freeman court takes particular note of the "week-
end" change which occurred when St. Elizabeth's Hospital reversed its previous determina-
tion and reclassified "psychopathic personality" as a "mental disease." See Blocker v. United
States, 288 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J. concurring).
26. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 621 (2d Cir. 1966).
27. See Mueller, M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent Events in the Law of
Incapacity, 50 GEo. L.J. 105, 116 (1961).
28. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 623 (2d. Cir. 1966).
29. Id. at 624.
30. Id. at 623.
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pert psychiatric testimony.3 ' These were the considerations which led
to the adoption of the ALI test.
In spite of these advantages, certain cricitisms have been directed at
the ALI test. One such criticism is that sociopathic personality is excluded
from consideration as a criminally irresponsible condition.3 2 The view
is expressed that there may be future scientific discoveries which would
necessitate a change in the concept of treating the sociopath as criminally
responsible. However, the court recognized that the ALI test is not per-
fect33 and, if and when such an occurrence takes place, the test should
be changed. 4 But, until such a time, the ALI test seems to offer the most
satisfactory solution.
Doubt has also been expressed regarding the competency of psy-
chiatrists to testify upon whether the accused has "adequate capacity"
to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct.3 This
approach suggests that there would remain restrictions upon expert psy-
chiatric testimony and that the difficulty in testifying in the right-wrong
context would merely be transposed to an "adequate capacity" context.
Although the test is stated in terms of a standard there is no indication
that the view has been taken that psychiatric testimony will be limited
in such a manner. 6 Assuming that such a view has been taken, the prob-
lem has been specifically recognized by the American Law Institute.
Therefore, lack of substantial capacity is called for rather than complete
lack of capacity. Thus, the psychiatrist is not faced with the problem of
having to testify in terms of an "ultimate extreme of total incapacity."3 7
Such a test offers a great deal more latitude to psychiatric testimony
than the M'Naghten Rule, while at the same time, giving a workable
standard to the jury. By adopting the ALI test, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has recognized that where the problem to be faced
has two extremes, some middle ground must be sought.
Richard S. Dorjzaun
31. Id. at 623.
32. Moore, Jr., supra note 6, at 70.
33. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1966).
34. This is not expressly stated in the opinion; however there is certain language to
indicate that this would be the holding of the court in such instance:
The impossibility of guaranteeing that a new rule will always be infallible
cannot justify continued adherance to an outmoded standard, sorely at variance with
enlightened medical and legal scholarship.
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 624 (2d. Cir. 1966).
This passage refers to M'Naghten but, if the ALI test were to become obsolete, such
argument would readily apply.
35. Overholser, supra note 13, at 530.
36. See United States v. Freeman', 357 F.2d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1966).
37. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.01 comment at 158 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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